Music can be defi ned as organized sound material in time. This chapter explores the links between the development of ideas about music and those driven by the concept of the embodied mind. Music composition has evolved from symbolic notated pitches to converge onto the expression of sound fi ligrees driven by new techniques of instrumental practice and composition associated with the development of new interfaces for musical expression. The notion of the organization of sound material in time adds new dimensions to musical information and its symbolic representations. To illustrate our point of view, a number of music systems are presented that have been realized as exhibitions and performances. We consided these synthetic music compositions as experiments in situated aesthetics. These examples follow the philosophy that a theory of mind, including one of creativity and aesthetics, will be critically dependent on its realization as a real-world artifact because only in this way can such a theory of an open and interactive system as the mind be fully validated. Examples considered include RoBoser, a real-world composition system that was developed in the context of a theory of mind and brain called distributed adaptive control (DAC), and " ADA: intelligent space," where the process of music expression was transported from a robot arena to a large-scale interactive space that established communication with its visitors through multi-modal composition. Subsequently, re(per)curso, a mixed reality hybrid human-machine performance, is analyzed for ways of integrating the development of music and narrative. Finally, the chapter concludes with an examination of how multimodal control structures driven by brain-computer interfaces (BCI) can give rise to a brain orchestra that controls complex sound production without the use of physical interfaces. All these examples show that the production of sound material in time that is appreciated by human observers does not need to depend on the symbolically notated pitches of a single human composer but can emerge from the interaction between machines, driven by simple rules and their environment.
Introduction
One contemporary defi nition of music, given by the composer Edgar Varèse , holds that "music is organized sound." Here we expand this defi nition to: " music is the organization of sound material in time." Our thesis in this chapter is that in the twentieth century, sound gradually gained center stage in the musical production realm and that it is possible to compare this shift with theories of the embodiment of mind. Starting with the use of sonorities in Claude Debussy's music in the beginning of last century and concomitant with the development of more precise mechanisms for capturing and broadcasting sound via recording, microphones, speakers, and computers, passing through musique concrète (Schaeffer 2012) , the notion of music composition diverges from symbolic notated pitches to converge onto the expression of sound fi ligrees. These compositional trends resulted in and were driven by the development of new techniques of instrumental practice associated with the development of new interfaces for music expression, methods for sound synthesis using digital instruments, and interactive devices used for human-machine interaction. The notion of the organization of sound material in time adds dimensions to musical information and its symbolic representations. Essentially we see a shift from the top-down specifi cation of musical pieces in the Western musical tradition, from the single genius of the single composer to the tightly controlled production pipeline of the conductor and the orchestra to a paradigm where musical structure emerges from the interaction between music systems and their environment. Indeed, music research has evolved toward analyzing the nature of the sound phenomena and the various possibilities of extracting information from sound pressure waves via spectral analysis, and major advances have been made in the area of recognizing timbre (Peeters et al. 2010) , including those of percussion instruments (Herrera et al. 2002) . This emphasis on sound as such, combined with new technologies for its synthesis and combination in complex compositions, has shifted the focus from composing for a particular musical piece to designing for a potential space of musical expression, where the particular musical piece rendered is synthesized in real time and defi ned through the interaction between the music system and its environment. To illustrate our point of view, we present in the next sections a trajectory that starts with the so-called RoBoser, 1 a real-world composition system that generates coherent musical symbolic organization and production using trajectories produced by robots without establishing a process based on preestablished macro-level rules. Instead of using generative grammars, we tested the possibility that long-term musical forms can emerge from the iteration of simpler local rules by a system that interacts with its environment, RoBoser (Manzolli and Verschure 2005) . The data streams of RoBoser were associated with the internal representations of a robot control architecture, called distributed adaptive control (DAC) (for a review, see Verschure 2012), especially with regard to its reactive mechanisms of attraction and repulsion 1 Supplemental online information is available at http://specs.upf.edu/installations (for video and sound tracks of the RoBoser-derived systems discussed in this chapter as well as additional material references). See also http://esforum.de/sfr10/verschure.html to light stimuli and collisions and the acquired responses to visual events. The second system we analyze is " ADA: intelligent space"; in this case the process of music expression was transported from the robot arena to a large-scale space (Eng et al. 2005a, b) . We tested the interaction between the stimuli generated by the space (sound, light, computer graphics) and visitors' behaviors as a way of producing synthetic emotions and their expression in sound material (Wasserman et al. 2003) . With ADA, we worked with the concept that the association of music with other forms of expression can communicate internal emotional states of the controller of the space, where emotions were defi ned by the ability of the space to achieve its multiple goals. In the hybrid humanmachine mixed reality performance re(per)curso (Mura et al. 2008) , we verify ways of integrating the development of music and narrative through largescale interaction. The structural pillars of this chronicle were not a script or a storyteller's description; in this new perspective we used the concept of recursion as a possible way of constructing meaning. Precisely, in a recursive process between humans and synthetic agents, including an avatar in the virtual world, a meaningful exchange was realized through their interactions. Finally, we examine how multimodal control structures driven by brain-computer interfaces (BCI) can give rise to a "brain orchestra" that controls complex sounds production without the use of physical interfaces (Le Groux et al. 2010) . The Brain Orchestra performance capitalized on the production of sound material through real-time synthetic composition systems by allowing an emotional conductor to drive the affective connotation of the composition in real-time through her physiological states, thus giving rise to an emergent narrative. All of these examples show that the production of sound material in time that is appreciated by human observers does not need to depend on the symbolically notated pitches of a single human composer but can emerge from the interaction between machines, driven by simple rules, and their environment.
In analyzing this paradign shift in the production of music, we will also assess how the broadening of concepts of music in recent years might assist us in understanding the brain, and vice versa. Much of the theoretical study of music has been based on the tonal music system developed in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Christensen 2002) . Such a foundation, however, excludes a large variety of music generated outside this geographic region and time frame.
A number of suggestions have been made to defi ne the key features of tonal music: from the subjective analysis provided by Schenkerian theory (Schenker and Jonas 1979) to the work of Eugene Narmour (1990), which was inspired by gestalt psychology. Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff (1983) distinguish four hierarchical structures, or domains, in tonal music:
1. pitch material (time-span reduction), 2. metric and meter, 3. harmonic and melodic structure (prolongational reduction), and 4. motives, phrases, and sections ( grouping).
In each of these domains, akin to the notion of grammar in language (see Lerdahl, this volume), two sets of rules defi ne possible and actual "legal" output structures: well-formedness and preference rules, respectively. A practical expression of such a formal approach toward tonal music can be found in the so-called experiments in musical intelligence of David Cope (2004) . Based on a prior analysis of harmonic relationships, hierarchical structure, and stylistic patterns of specifi c compositions, Cope has written algorithms to generate plausible new pieces of music in the style of the original input music. In contrast to a formal rule-based approach, others have argued from an ethnographic point of view that the notion of musical universals is questionable, and that music is largely defi ned as a social construct with some invariants with respect to pitch contrasts and timbre (Patel 2003) . As yet, the question of what music is and whether it is based on universals of perception, cognition, emotion, and action has no clear answer (for a skeptical discussion of universals in language, see Levinson this volume). We propose that building autonomous synthetic music composition systems will be a key methodology in resolving this issue.
A further complication in elucidating the causal organization of music is the practically boundless ability of the brain to adapt to its environment at varying timescales (Bell 1999 ). An additional bias to this discussion stems from the grammar-oriented linguistic approach toward music, which implies that music, like language, is conceived of as being representationalist, formal, and internalist; in other words, it is "generated within the head." In sum, traditional Western music theories are formal structural theories (for a discussion on the distinction of structural and process descriptions of the computational mind, see Jackendoff 1987:37-39, 44) that apply primarily to the Western music (-score) tradition. Another distinguishing feature of the Western musical tradition is that it has adopted a very specifi c and limiting process model of expression: the perceiver is a passive listener who is exposed to the external genius of the composer, whose creation is mediated by a drone-like performer. The performer has mastered the interface between the musical score and the stream of sounds through a musical instrument. These instruments are designed with the goal of reliably producing pitches given physical models of sound production, often sacrifi cing the ecological validity of their use. This accounts for the superhuman effort it takes to fully master musical instruments. We call this the musical interface bottleneck and one could argue that it is one of the limiting factors on human creativity. Musical expression and experience is closely linked to the tools humans have developed for the production of pitches. These tools will increasingly become virtual, as opposed to physical, with deep implications for the future of music (Coessens 2011).
Symbolic artifi cial intelligence (AI), with its study of the disembodied mind following a computer metaphor (Newell 1990) , is fully coherent with the traditional theoretical treatment of music. Both can be characterized as rationalistic and grounded in rule-based analysis. Since the mid-1980s, traditional AI has been superseded by an alternative paradigm that is embodied, situated, and action oriented (Brooks 1991; Pfeifer and Bongard 2007; Pfeifer and Scheier 1999) . The associated developments in artifi cial life, connectionist or neural networks as well as behavior-based robotics have sparked interest in a more biologically grounded approach to the study of mind and behavior (Verschure 1993; Edelman 1987) , and we expect that comparative music and language research will follow suit. The question is: What shape will process-oriented theories of mind, brain, and behavior take, and to what extent will they enable comparative research on action, language, and music?
A biologically grounded approach has advantages, since it is founded on the dynamics of real-world interaction and embodiment. While various authors have emphasized the need to complement the study of language by methods which capture the real-world aspects of mind and brain, along with their realization and expression in action, including computational and robot-based approaches (Cangelosi 2010; Steels 2010), our focus here is on an approach to music within this framework (Verschure 1996 (Verschure , 1998 Le Groux and Verschure 2011) .
Despite the rapid development of computer music systems, some of it reviewed below, the transition still needs to be made from partial models for isolated tasks (at best evaluated with isolated empirical data) to general theories rooted in the recognition of the inherent embodiment of perception, emotion, cognition, and action (Verschure 1993; Leman 2007; Purwins et al. 2008a, b) . We argue that a general framework for computational theories of music processing must be action-oriented and refl ect the interaction of music-making (and language-using) systems. Implementation of compositional process prototypes using the interaction of multiple agents can give rise to a large number of generative structures producing a complex informational network. Composition is considered as an emerging organization of sound events and, more generally, as an organization of succession and overlapping elements of musical discourse (for an ethnographic perspective, see Lewis this volume). As a concrete realization of such an approach, we describe below the biologically grounded robot-based cognitive architecture, DAC, which has been proposed as an integrative and self-contained framework to understand mind, brain, and behavior (for a review, see Verschure 2012). In addition to a range of derived models in computational neuroscience (see also Arbib et al., this volume) , DAC provides the foundation for a series of experiments in situated multimodal composition and performance (summarized in later sections; for a discussion of processing models grounded in neuroscience, see Arbib et al., this volume From the 1950s and into the 1990s, the programmed computer was viewed in AI and related work in cognitive science as a model of the mind; this emphasized the underlying rules and representations and overcame the peripheralism of the behaviorists "empty organism" approach while ignoring the system-oriented analysis provided by cybernetics. During this period, AI remained committed to the functionalism of the computer metaphor, but it ran into a number of stumbling blocks:
• The frame problem, which demonstrates that symbolic AI systems will succumb to the exponential growth of their world models (McCarthy and Hayes 1969).
• The symbol-grounding problem, which shows that understanding cannot be achieved on the basis of a priori symbolic specifi cation (Searle 1980; Harnad 1990 ).
• The problem of situatedness, which argues that by virtue of being in the world, an agent need not represent its environment at all cost; the world also exists to represent itself (Suchman 1987).
• The frame of reference problem, which argues that when talking about internal representation, one needs to consider the point of origin; that is, whether they originated with a designer, an observer, or the agent itself (Clancey 1992; for an overview, see Verschure 1993; Pfeifer and Scheier 1999).
Essentially, these problems boil down to the issue of relying on representations that are not autonomously defi ned by an agent, but which are externally defi ned as a prior to the operation of the system and organized in an exponentially growing search space; in other words, the problem of priors (Verschure 1998) . This raises the fundamental question of how biophysical systems, like human brains, become interpretative systems capable of using meaningful signs (Deacon 2006). Connectionist models (i.e., networks of simplifi ed neuron-like elements whose connections vary according to certain "learning rules") were proposed in the late 1980s to solve some of these challenges (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986) . They had, however, diffi culty addressing the problem of priors: a supervised learning system still needs to "know" that an error was produced, and problems of scaling up to complex processing must be faced (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988) . Unlike symbolic computational systems, connectionist models could neither rely on symbolic representation nor on recursion. Indeed, one important implication of the concept of recursion for brain-like processing is that it must decouple the operators from symbols or the process from representation. Most theories of neural coding depend on the notion of labeled lines (Kumar et al. 2010) , where the connections between neurons are uniquely labeled with respect to their contribution to specifi c representations. This view originates in the earliest proposals on neural computation, such as the logic circuits of McCulloch and Pitts (1943) and the perceptron of Rosenblatt (1958) . Ultimately every connection in the network will have a specifi c label that contributes to the mappings the system can perform. There are very few proposals in the literature that show how the brain could achieve such a decoupling of process and representation. One of these, the so-called temporal population code (Wyss et al. 2003a; Luvizotto et al. 2012) , is discussed by Arbib et al. (this volume) .
Another concern in declaring recursion a natural category is that it is defi ned in the context of a logic that is constrained and sequential. Although the brain is by no means fully understood, it is a parallel structure that relies strongly on massive input-output transformations and a fast memory capacity at varying temporal scales (Rennó-Costa et al. 2010; Strick et al. 2009 ). Hence, the constraints under which it operates might be rather different from those requiring recursion and symbolic processing. We must be careful not to impose standard notions of hierarchy on the brain, such as the sense-think-act cycle which dates back to the nineteenth century psychophysicists of Donders, and which still is widely adhered to in cognitive science or the aforementioned perceptron and its contemporary descendants. On anatomical grounds, there is no reason for a strict distinction between sensory and motor areas (Vanderwolf 2007) . Theoretical studies have shown that the entropy in the activity of motor areas can be exploited to "sense" behavioral decision points (Wyss et al. 2003b) , thus blurring the strict distinction between perception and action.
Parallel to the necessity of using massive input-output transformations and multiscale memory capacity to understand the mind and brain, Western music developed over the last century the concept of "composition of mass" or "sound clouds," as in, for example, the compositions by Iannis Xenakis (1992) . Others, such as Steve Reich, used recursion to defi ne music as a gradual process (Schwartz 1981) . In his Études pour Piano (1985 Piano ( -2001 , which were inspired by fractal geometry (Mandelbrot 1977) , György Ligeti constructed complex sound textures based on iterations of rhythmic and melodic patterns called "pattern-mechanico compositions" (Clendinning 1993).
Even in a simple musical structure, such as in Clapping Music (composed by Reich in 1972 for two musicians, who perform it by clapping their hands), it is possible to observe how one temporal-scale "phase shift" produces a diversity of rhythmic perception (Colannino et. al. 2009 ). In Ligeti's 8 th Étude pour Piano, a simple recursive structure (based on the reiteration, in different octaves, of the pitch "A") produces a complex stratifi cation of pitch patterns (Roig-Francolí 1995; Palmer and Holleran 1994) .
In summary, application of the mathematical-logical concept of computation to fi nite real-world systems and their models requires us to explore intrinsic problems of this approach: the symbol-grounding problem, the frame problem, the problem of biological and cultural situatedness, and the frame of reference problem. In addition, to explain mechanism and interaction, processoriented theories of mind are needed. Moreover, computational modeling with robots is necessary to test issues of embodiment and interaction with the external world. Such an integrated control system of the agent combined with its embodiment constitutes a theory of the body-brain nexus in its own right. For instance, using the DAC architecture (see below) we have shown that a direct feedback exists between the structures that give rise to perception and the actions of an agent, or behavioral feedback (Verschure et al. 2003) . Hence, without understanding the interaction history of the agent, the specifi cs of its perceptual structures cannot be fully understood. The interaction history, in turn, depends on details of the morphology of the agent; its action repertoire and properties of the environment. Hence, we predict that behavioral feedback plays a decisive role in how perception, cognition, action, and experience are structured in all domains of human activity including music and language.
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the modeling of single neurons (for a brief introduction to a variety of approaches, see Koch et al. 2003) , the key point is that such models refl ect the microscopic organization of the anatomy and physiology of specifi c areas of the nervous system. Thus, the question then becomes: How can such a level of description be scaled up to overall function (Carandini 2012)? The so-called schema theory offers perhaps an alternate approach (see Arbib, this volume). Schema theory proposes a hierarchical decomposition of brain function rather than structure, although some of the schemas in a model may well be mapped onto specifi c neural structures. Schema theory faces, however, the problem of any functionalist theory: in decoupling from physical realization, its models are underconstrained (Searle 1980) and thus cannot overcome the challenge of the problem of priors. A third approach is grounded in the notion of convergent validation. Here, multiple sources of constraints (e.g., behavior, anatomy, and physiology) are brought together in a computational framework (Verschure 1996) : the DAC architecture, which aims at integrating across these functional and structural levels of description (discussed further below). Other examples can be found in the Darwin series of real-world artifacts proposed by Edelman (2007) . Arbib (this volume) also discusses a range of other models, some explored in simulation, others using robots.
Lessons from Robotic Approaches to Music Systems
In documenting Babbage's analytical engine, Ada Lovelace Lady Byron anticipated that the mechanized computational operations of this machine could enter domains that used to be the exclusive realm of human creativity (Lovelace 1843/1973):
Again, it [the Analytical Engine] might act upon other things besides number, were objects found whose mutual fundamental relations could be expressed by those of the abstract science of operations...Supposing, for instance, that the fundamental relations of pitched sounds in the science of harmony and of musical composition were susceptible of such expression and adaptations, the engine might compose elaborate and scientifi c pieces of music of any degree of complexity or extent.
Indeed, now 170 years later, such machines do exist and computer-based music composition has reached high levels of sophistication. For instance, based on a prior analysis of harmonic relationships, hierarchical structure, and stylistic patterns of specifi c composition(s), Cope has written algorithms to generate plausible new pieces of music in the style of the composer behind the original pieces (Cope 2004). However, despite these advances, there is no general theory of creativity that either explains creativity or can directly drive the construction of creative machines. Defi nitions of creativity mostly follow a Turing test-like approach, where the quality of a process or product is declared to be creative dependent on the subjective judgment by other humans of its novelty and value (Sternberg 1999; Pope 2005; Krausz et al. 2009 ; for a more detailed analysis, see below). The emerging fi eld of computational creativity defi nes its goals explicitly along these lines (Colton and Wiggins 2012). Although these approaches could generate interesting applications, its defi nition is not suffi cient either as an explanation nor as a basis to build a transformative technology as the classic arguments of Searle against the use of the Turing test in AI has shown (Searle 1980): mimicry of surface features is not to be equated with emulation of the underlying generative processes. For instance, Cope's algorithms critically depend on his own prior analysis of the composer's style, automatically leading to a similar symbol grounding problem that has undercut the promise of the AI program (Harnad 1990) . The question thus becomes: How can we defi ne a creative musical system that is autonomous?
Computational models implemented in robots provide new ways of studying embodied cognition, including a role in grounding both language and music. In particular, models of perception, cognition, and action have been linked to music composition and perception in the context of new media art (Le Groux and Verschure 2011). In new media art, an interactive environment functions as a kind of "laboratory" for computational models of cognitive processing and interactive behavior. Given our earlier critique of the rationalist framework paradigm for music, where the knowledge in the head of the composer is expressed through rules and representations and projected onto the world without any feedback or interaction, it is surprising that the advent of advanced automated rule execution machines (i.e., computers) in the twentieth century has not given rise to a massive automation of music generation, based on the available formal linguistic theories and their application to music composition. (The same surprise can be extended to the fi eld of linguistics in general, where machine-based translators are still struggling to be accepted by humans.) This raises a fundamental question: Are grammar-like theories of language more effective as post hoc descriptions of existing musical structures, or can they generate plausible and believable ones de novo? In other words, does music theory suffer from a form of the symbol-grounding problem that brought classical AI to its knees (Searle 1980)? Is a similar shift from a priori rules and representations to acquired, enactive, and embodied semantics necessary, as has befallen the stagnated cognitive revolution (Verschure and Althaus 2003)?
Human-Machine Interaction Design in New Media Art
With the advent of new technologies that have emphasized interaction and novel interfaces, alternative forms and modes of music generation have been realized (Rowe 1993; Winkler 2001) . This development raises fundamental questions on the role of embodiment as well as the environment and interaction in the generation of music and musical aesthetics. In addition, it places emphasis on a more situated and externalist view. In most cases, interactive music systems depend on a human user to control a stream of musical events, as in the early example of David Rockeby's Very Nervous System (1982 System ( -1991 . Similarly, the use of biosignals in music performance goes back to the early work on music and biofeedback control of Rosenboom (1975 Rosenboom ( , 1990 . This pioneering perspective on music performance was developed to integrate musical performance with the human nervous system.
The Plymouth musical brain-computer interface (BCI) project (Miranda and Wanderley 2006) was established to develop assistive technologies based on interactive music controlled by the BCI. This new technology has been proposed to support human creativity by using technology to overcome the musical interface bottleneck.
Tod Machover's The Brain Opera (1996) was inspired by ideas from Marvin Minsky on the agent-based nature of mind. This opera consists of an introduction, in which the audience experiments and plays with a variety of Machover's instruments (including large percussive devices that resemble neurons), followed by a 45-minute musical event orchestrated by three conductors. The music incorporates recordings made by the audience as it arrived, along with material and musical contributions made by participants via the World Wide Web. For a detailed description of the musical instruments that use sensing technology in The Brain Opera, see Paradiso (1999) .
Recently there has been a shift in music production and new media art. Interactive computer music provides new devices for musical expression and has been developed in different contexts for different applications. Miranda and Wanderley (2006) discuss the development and musical use of digital musical instruments (DMIs); that is, musical instruments comprised of a gestural controller used to set the parameters of a digital synthesis algorithm in real time, through predefi ned mapping strategies. In addition, international forums, such as the New Interfaces for Musical Expression (NIME), have convened researchers and musicians to share knowledge on new musical interface design (NIME 2013). In parallel, the concept of an "orchestra" has expanded to incorporate the use of computers and interfaces as musical instruments. For instance, the Stanford Laptop Orchestra (SLOrk; http://slork.stanford.edu/) is a computer-mediated ensemble made up of human-operated laptops, human performers, controllers, and a custom multi-channel speaker array which render unique computer meta-instruments.
Another ensemble that explores the use of DMIs is the McGill Digital Orchestra (Ferguson and Wanderley 2010). Here, two types of real-time information are used-digital audio information (i.e., the sonic output of an instrument) and gestural control data (i.e., the performance gestures of the instrumentalist)-and reproduced, stored, analyzed, recreated and/or transformed. This particular type of digital technology allows the musical potential of DMIs to be studied in an interdisciplinary setting and furthers the development of prototypes in close collaboration with instrument designers.
As mentioned above, much of the current musical repertoire is structured on perceptual attributes of sound that are not necessarily the ones related to pitchoriented symbolic music. Sound attributes, such as roughness and brightness, are also considered as structural elements of current compositional trends. The new development of DMIs liberates us from having to construct instruments based on the physical properties of materials, and thus disconnects the interface from the production of pitches. As mentioned above, the body's perceptual, cognitive, motor, and kinesthetic responses have to be reconfi gured to the needs and constraints concerning action and perception in this new space, and the interface can now be optimized to its user (Coessens 2011). The point could be made that the history of music has been characterized by the invention of new musical instruments or the adaptation of musical instruments from other cultures. Indeed, the use of musical instruments as such is embodied, and the shift to computer-generated sound with arbitrary interfaces will remove this form of the embodiment of musical experience. However, we emphasize that musical instruments have thus far exploited the adaptive capabilities of the human body-brain nexus as opposed to building on its specifi c natural confi rmations. As a result, we claim that a price has been paid in terms of both the quality and the accessibility of musical expression.
The Distributed Adaptive Control Architecture
The limitations of the computer metaphor, as summarized in the problem of priors, explicitly challenge our understanding of mind and brain. The DAC architecture (Figure 16 .1) was formulated in response to this challenge and provides the integrated real-time, real-world means to model perception, cognition, and action (Verschure 1992 (Verschure , 2003 (Verschure , 2012 . In particular, DAC solves the problem of symbol grounding by relying on autonomous and embodied learning to provide a basis for the world model in the history of the agent itself on the basis of which cognition emerges. This is augmented with situated action , showing four tightly coupled layers: soma, reactive, adaptive, and contextual. Across these layers, three functional columns of organization can be distinguished: exosensing, defi ned as the sensation and perception of the world; endosensing, the detection and signaling of states derived from the physically instantiated self; and the interface to the world through action. At the level of the contextual layer, these three axes become tightly integrated. The arrows show the primary fl ow of information, mapping exo-and endosensing into action. At each level of organization, increasingly more complex and memory-dependent mappings from sensory states to actions are generated, dependent on the internal state of the agent. The somatic layer designates the body itself and defi nes three fundamental sources of information: sensation, needs, and actuation. The reactive layer endows a behaving system with a prewired repertoire of refl exes, enabling it to display simple adaptive behaviors, unconditioned stimuli, and responses on the basis of a number of predefi ned behavioral systems through a self-regulatory or allostatic model (Sanchez-Fibla et al. 2010 ). The adaptive layer, linked to a valence-attribution system, provides the mechanisms for the construction of the world and agent state space through the adaptive classifi cation of sensory events and the reshaping of responses using prediction-based learning mechanisms (Duff and Verschure 2010). The contextual layer forms sequential representations of these states in short-and long-term memory in relation to the goals of the agent and its value functions. These sequential representations form plans for action which can be executed, dependent on the matching of their sensory states to states of the world further primed by memory. The contextual layer can be further described by an autobiographical memory system, thus facilitating insight and discovery. It has been demonstrated (Verschure and Althaus 2003) that the dynamics of these memory structures are equivalent to a Bayesian optimal analysis of foraging, thus providing an early example of the predictive brain hypothesis.
by mapping acquired knowledge onto policies for action through learning. DAC is one of the most elaborate real-world neuromorphic cognitive architectures available today. It is based on the assumption that a common Bauplan (blueprint) underlies all vertebrate brains that have ever existed (Allman and Martin 2000) . DAC proposes that for an agent to generate action and successfully survive, the agent must address the following questions:
1. Why? (Motivation for action in terms of needs, drives, and goals must be clarifi ed.) 2. What? (Objects involved in the action must be specifi ed.) 3. Where? (Location of objects must be defi ned from the perspective of the world and self.) 4. When? ( Timing of an action must be specifi ed relative to the dynamics of the world.)
These questions constitute the "H4W" problem, and each W represents a large set of sub-questions of varying complexity (Verschure 2012). H4W has to be answered at different spatiotemporal scales. Further, DAC proposes that the neuraxis is conceptualized as comprising three tightly coupled layers-reactive, adaptive, and contextual-which roughly follow the division of the mammalian brain in the brainstem, diencephalon, and telencephalon: 1. At the reactive level, predefi ned refl exes, or motor schemas, defi ne simple behaviors that provide basic functionality (e.g., defense, orientation, mobility, etc.). Activation of each refl ex, however, is considered to be a signal for learning at subsequent levels. 2. The adaptive layer acquires representations of states of the environment, as detected by the sensors of the robot, and shapes the predefi ned actions to these states via classical conditioning implemented with a local prediction-based Hebbian learning rule. Essentially, the adaptive layer addresses a fundamental problem of developing a state space description of the environment (sensation) and the degrees of freedom of the body (action), conditional on the internal states of the organism (drives/emotions/goals). 3. At the level of the contextual layer, the states of the world and those of the body are integrated into sequential short-and long-term memory systems, conditional on the goal achievement of the agent. Sequential memories can be recalled through sensory matching and internal chaining among memory sequences (Figure 16 .2).
At each level of organization, increasingly more complex, memory-dependent mappings from sensory states to actions are generated that are dependent on the internal state of the agent.
The DAC architecture is unique in the following ways:
1. It is a complete architecture integrating perception, emotion, cognition, and action (for a comparison with other cognitive architectures, see Verschure 2012). 2. It resolves the symbol-grounding problem in the context of perception, cognition, and action supporting real-world behavior. 3. Specifi c DAC subsystems have been generalized to identifi ed subsystems of the brain, including the cerebellum, amygdala, cerebral cortex, and hippocampus (Duff et al. 2011; Rennó-Costa et al. 2010; Wyss et al. 2006; Hofstötter et al. 2002; Sanchez-Montanes et al. 2000; Marcos et al. 2013 ). (1) The perceptual prototype e and the motor activity m generated by the adaptive layer are acquired and stored as a segment if the discrepancy between predicted and occurring sensory states, D, falls below its predefi ned threshold, Θ D . D is the time-averaged reconstruction error of the perceptual learning system: x -e. (2) If a goal state is reached (e.g., reward or punishment detected), the content of short-term memory (STM) is retained in longterm memory (LTM) as a sequence conserving its order, and STM is reset. Every sequence is labeled with respect to the specifi c goal and internal state to which it pertains. (3) The motor population MM receives input from the IS populations according to the rules of the adaptive layer. (4) If the input of the IS population to MM is subthreshold, the values of the current CS prototypes, e, are matched against those stored in LTM. (5) The MM population receives the motor response calculated as a weighted sum over the memory segments of LTM as input. (6) The segments that contributed to the executed action will prospectively bias segments with which they are associated.
4. It can give rise to structured and complex behavior, including foraging, maze learning, and solving logical puzzles (Duff et al. 2011; Verschure and Althaus 2003) .
The DAC architecture has been validated in a range of domains, including foraging, classical and operant conditioning, and adaptive social behaviors by a human accessible space (Eng et al. 2005a, b) . It has also been generalized to operate with multiple sensory modalities (Mathews et al. 2009 ) and has been augmented with an integrated top-down bottom-up attention system (Mathews et al. 2008; Mathews and Verschure 2011) . The DAC architecture autonomously generates representations of its primary sensory inputs at the level of the adaptive layer using a fully formalized neuronal model based on the objectives of prediction and correlation (Duff and Verschure 2010; Verschure and Pfeifer 1992). Indeed, more recently, these have been proposed to be the key principles underlying the organization of the brain (Friston 2009). In the case of foraging, the dynamics of the memory structures of DAC have been demonstrated to be equivalent to a Bayesian optimal analysis (Verschure and Althaus 2003). The principle of behavioral feedback discovered with DAC (Verschure 2003), mentioned above, essentially states that because of learning, behavioral habits emerge that restrict the effective environment to which an agent is exposed. Given that perceptual structures are sensitive to the statistics of their inputs, this bias in input sampling translates into a bias in perception itself.
The DAC framework proposes that the memory systems for contextual action generation provide a substrate onto which language and music can be generated. In other words, DAC proposes that the brain has evolved to defi ne events, states of the world, and the body, and to organize these in time-the events-in-time hypothesis. In the context of the computational mind hypothesis, the question arises as to what extent the processes implemented in DAC can account for recursion. The contextual memory of DAC does provide a substrate for compositionality, where one active sequence can be effectively embedded in others through association or can predefi ne heuristics for goaloriented chaining. In addition, the interactions between short-and long-term memory are bidirectional so that active states of long-term memory can be recombined and reused through parallel interaction with short-term memory. Finally, DAC solves one important challenge to the Turing machine model: DAC is situated in the real world. Whereas the Turing machine is defi ned on the basis of an infi nite sequential tape, DAC uses the real world as a representation of itself. Actions lead to changes in its task domain and can subsequently be perceived and remapped onto memory, leading to new actions; that is, situated recursion exploiting both the environment and memory.
An application of DAC-the RoBoser system (Manzolli and Verschure 2005)-has been used in interactive installations, performance, and music composition, to which we now turn. DAC is uniquely suited for this step because the fundamental components of an interactive performance requires the multilevel integration that DAC offers, including systems for perception of states of the world, their appraisal relative to the goals of the performance system, planning of actions, and the execution of actions. In other words, we consider the technical infrastructure required for an interactive performance as a robot turned inside-out, with the dynamics resulting from the actions of other agents in the environment: performers.
From RoBoser to ADA and XIM
An alternative to the formalistic paradigm of music composition was proposed in the RoBoser project, where the musical output of the system sonifi es the dynamics of a complex autonomous real-world system (Manzolli and Verschure 2005). First exhibited in 1998 in Basel as an interactive installation, RoBoser addressed the fundamental problem of novelty in music composition. The ability to induce novelty and surprise in listeners is recognized as one of the hallmarks of human creativity expressed in music. Solutions to this problem, however, can be plainly random. Take for instance, Mozart's so-called Würfelspiel, where a roll of dice is used to select sections of music, which are then pieced together to form a musical composition (Mozart 1787). The Würfelspiel can be seen as an attempt to solve the grouping problem, as it combines musical motives into larger structures through random choices, dictated by dice. Contemporary composers have followed suit using various methods including generative grammars, cellular automata, Markov chains, genetic algorithms, and artifi cial neural networks (Nierhaus 2009).
In the RoBoser system, the question of whether the interaction between instantiated musical primitives and the real world can give rise to plausible musical structures is explicitly addressed. To answer this question, a synthetic multivoice composition engine, called Curvasom (Maia et al. 1999) , is coupled to a mobile robot and the neuromorphic control architecture (i.e., DAC). This renders a system consistent with work on multivoiced music perception (Palmer and Holleran 1994) . In addition, the RoBoser system makes the observer a participant as well as a composer through interaction, thus solving the interface bottleneck.
Curvasom is based on a number of internal heuristics that transform input states into timed events sonifi ed using the MIDI sound protocol, or "sound functors," resulting in a set of parametric sound specifi cations with which the system is seeded (Manzolli and Maia 1998). The integrated composition engine sonifi es a number of states of the robot and its controller. These include the peripheral states of the sensors of the robot, the default exploration mode of the robot, and its internal states, which can be driven by either predefi ned stimulus events or acquired ones. States of the robot may change properties of single voices (e.g., intensity or timbre) and of all voices (e.g., changes in tempo or shifts in pitch). A detailed analysis of the robot performance showed that the integrated robot-composition system was able to generate complex and coherent musical structures (Manzolli and Verschure 2005) . In a subsequent generalization of this approach, the interaction was expanded to include a complete building, called ADA (Figure 16 .3; see also http://specs.upf.edu/ installation/547). In ADA, audiovisual expression is generated on the basis of the interaction between the visitors to the space and the neuromorphic control system of the building (Wasserman et al. 2003) . Hence, a continuum of expression including sound and vision can be realized. Confi rming the validity of the music generated by RoBoser, we note that the soundtrack for a movie on Ada, generated by Roboser, was awarded the prize for best soundtrack in the 2001 national Swiss movie awards, thus passing a musical Turing test (Wasserman et al. 2003) .
The results obtained with the RoBoser system are signifi cant with respect to the discussion on music and language because they show how the hierarchical structure of music can be obtained by relying on the hierarchical structure of a complex real-world system, as opposed to that of an internal grammar which mimics the complexity of overt behavior. This suggests that although the formal approach might provide for an effective description of music, it may not capture the full richness required for music generation. The plausibility of this assertion is strengthened by the fact that the RoBoser paradigm has been realized in real-world systems of multiple forms and functionalities, as opposed to relying solely on the descriptive coherence and internal consistency offered by grammar-based approaches. The skeptic could argue that it takes a human to make "real" music. However, we emphasize that this argument hinges on the defi nition of "real" which is ontologically suspect. We will skirt this issue by focusing on the pragmatics of music production and the effectivity of the RoBoser system in being accepted by human audiences and performers, together with its commitment to unraveling the generative structures behind musical aesthetics. Indeed, the RoBoser paradigm has opened the way to a view on musical composition, production, and performance that emphasizes the controlled induction of subjective states in observers in close interaction with them. It has also led to a new psychologically grounded system called SMuSe, which is based on situatedness, emotional feedback, and a biomimetic architecture (Le Groux and Verschure 2009b, 2010; Le Groux et al. 2008) . With SmuSe, the listener becomes part performer and part composer. For instance, using direct neural feedback systems a so-called brain tuner was constructed to optimize specifi c brain states measured in the EEG through musical composition; that is, not direct sonifi cation of the EEG waves. This highlights the differences in the design objectives between interactive-cognitive music systems and Western tonal music. Shifting from complete prespecifi cation by a single human composer to the parameterization of musical composition, the psycho-acoustical validation of these parameters and the mapping of external states onto these musical parameters rendering novel interaction-driven compositions (Le Groux 2006; Le Groux and Verschure 2011).
The RoBoser paradigm has been generalized from the musical domain to that of multimodal composition in the ADA exhibition (Figure 16 .3) and other performances, such as re(per)curso 2 (Mura et al. 2008) 3 and The Brain Orchestra (Figure 16 .4) (Le Groux et al. 2010 ). This raises the fundamental question of whether a universal structure underlies human auditory and visual experiences based on a unifi ed meaning and discourse system of the human brain, as opposed to being fragmented along a number of modality-specifi c modules (see also Seifert et al., this volume) . This invariant property could be the drive of the brain to fi nd meaning in events organized in time, or to defi ne a narrative structure for the multimodal experiences to which it is exposed. In terms of the applications of the RoBoser paradigm, we conceptualize its aesthetic outputs as audiovisual narratives whose underlying compositional primitives and processes share many features across modalities. One can think of the synesthetic compositions of Scriabin as a classic example, but with one important difference: currently, machines can generate such interactive compositions on the basis of relatively simple principles in close interaction with different states of human observers/performers as opposed to that originating in a singular genius.
These examples illustrate that aesthetic musical experience can be, at least partially, understood as emerging from the interaction between human users and open music systems. That this insight has come so late is partially due to the fact that Western music is based on the view of the perceiver as a passive listener: someone who is exposed to the external genius of the composer that is mediated by the performer. Accordingly, the perceiver (or listener) is not an active participant. The listener, however, is very versatile and resilient with respect to the mode of perception offered (i.e., active or passive). We have demonstrated, in contrast, that appreciation of interaction correlates with the level of activity of the perceiver (Eng et al. 2005a, b) . In addition, contemporary technology has reduced the instrumentalist's monopoly on producing music. Using a range of technologies, new interfaces to musical instruments have been created that are more ecologically valid (Paradiso et al. 2000) . We expect these technologies to contribute to a fundamental change in the future, and envision the deployment of systems that will be able to generate individualized multimodal compositions in real time, dependent on both explicit and implicit states of active human performers and perceivers (Le Groux et al. 2008; Le Groux and Verschure 2009a, 2010 ). An early example of such a system is the eXperience Induction Machine 4 , which is a direct descendent of RoBoser and ADA (Inderbitzin et al. 2009 ). 4 See Example 3 at http://www.esforum.de/sfr10/verschure.html Figure 16 .4 The Multimodal Brain Orchestra (MBO): four members of the MBO play virtual musical instruments solely through brain-computer interface technology. The orchestra is conducted while an emotional conductor, seated in the front right corner, is engaged to drive the affective content of a multimodal composition through means of her physiological state. Above the right-hand side of the podium, the affective visual narrative Chekëh is shown, while on the left-hand side, MBO-specifi c displays visualize the physiological states of the MBO members and the transformation of the audiovisual narrative.
Conclusion
We have juxtaposed the traditional rationalist perspective on mind and music with an emerging trend in the study of mind and brain to emphasize the interaction between an agent and its environment. The "agent" terminology of AI (Russell and Norvig 2010) may serve as a basis for reevaluating computational models of music and language processing, where this agent is embodied and instantiated in the real world.
An action-oriented approach to music subsumes many approaches: from score analysis to the modeling of music cognition. In addition, it is more congruent with research in ethnomusicology and music sociology (Clayton 2009; Clayton et al. 2005) , because it does not focus on purely Western concepts of musical structure (i.e., concepts based on score-oriented reasoning and language-mediated musical structure and meaning). Music is a study of much interest for its sonic complexity and its perceptual and cognitive, affective impact.
As an example of a more situated and brain-based approach toward musical creativity and aesthetics, we have described the DAC architecture and its translation into an increasingly more complex and interactive paradigm for situated multi-modal composition and performance (Figure 16 .5). We have shown that DAC has given rise to a range of novel performances and installations that redefi ne musical composition and expression. We have also illustrated how the unidirectional paradigm of the Western musical tradition, with its specifi c representationalist formalization and unidirectional production stream (from the active composer to the passive listener via the drone-like musician) can be expanded to a model where the composer becomes a designer of a space of musical expression to be explored by an active observer/perfomer. RoBoser has demonstrated that plausible musical structures can emerge that are appreciated by an audience, and that the interface bottleneck can be eliminated. This form of interaction leads to the exploitation of a situated recursion between the performer/observer and an emergent musical structure, each action operating on the musical output produced by previous actions.
In terms of radical change in music production and perception, two different aspects were highlighted: (a) new music can emerge from machines, whether or not in interaction with humans, and (b) the resulting lessons can be used to inform our understanding of the millennia-long human experience of music, as well as our attempts to probe the neural mechanisms and social interactions which support it. When Beethoven composed his symphonies, or when we sing along to a recording or with a group, or when we dance spontaneously to a piece of music, we engage in " musical narratives." Instead of caricaturing the whole of Western musical experience to mere passivity, we suggest that such experiences can be used to enrich our understanding of the brain and culture, and perhaps the whole of human experience.
The development of advanced interactive synthetic music composition also raises a fundamental issue concerning the form that a theory of music aesthetics will take (Verschure 1998; Le Groux and Verschure 2011). The synthetic approach expressed in RoBoser argues that the rules embedded in the machine encapsulate the principles of musical aesthetics. It was with this in mind that RoBoser was purposefully developed. However, by virtue of being open and interactive, these technologies also delineate the contributions of both intrinsic and external factors in the human experience of music, language, and action.
Hence, universals of music do not depend on its mode of codifi cation, and we should be careful in not mistaking the ontological status of these codifications. We propose that interactive synthetic music systems offer promising strategies for a comparative research program on language, music, and action. Their ability to combine computational modeling, robotics, and empirical research may advance knowledge of embodied and situated perspectives on music, language, and the brain, and further our understanding of music and creativity. In particular, the rise of these new music technologies will help us to overcome the bottleneck of the instrument, which will herald a new liberalized phase of music production, and experience that emphasizes the expression of the direct creative inspiration of many as opposed to the genius of the few. 
